Abstract. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an in¯nitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satis¯es many appealing properties, describing the e®ect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satis¯es several equity conditions, e.g., equaltreatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-o® between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties.
Introduction
In this paper we study situations where the total of initial endowments of an in¯nitely divisible good is reallocated among a group of agents. In many cases where free disposal of the good is not allowed (non-price models) it is natural to assume that the agents' preferences over their shares of the good are single-peaked. Each agent has an optimal share of the good, below which and above which preference is decreasing.
There is a wide literature exploring the situation where the problem is reduced to the allocation of a total endowment. As described in Sprumont [7] , rationing in a two-good economy in which prices are in disequilibrium can be interpreted as such a distribution problem with total endowment. A solution for this class of problems satisfying many appealing properties is the uniform rule. Benassy [2] described the uniform rule as a strategy-proof rationing scheme: an agent who misrepresents his preference cannot improve his outcome. Sprumont [7] started the axiomatic analysis in 1991. He proved that the uniform rule is the only rule which satis¯es Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness and anonymity. Ching [3] weakens anonymity to a condition called equal treatment of equals: agents announcing the same preferences are treated equally. The axiomatic analysis of Thomson (see [8] , Date . August, 1995.
1 [9] and [10] ) provides several characterizations of the uniform rule including consistency and monotonicity properties.
In this paper we study similar properties in the more general setting of economies where agents have initial endowments. This extension of the model quite naturally arises if we observe distribution problems with total endowments where preferences might change over time. Consider for example the distribution of a task (e.g.,¯xed amount of teaching hours) among the members of a group. The (single-peaked) preferences of the agents do not only depend on the total endowment, but also on external factors (time for research, other tasks) which are not¯xed. So, over time, preferences might change, calling for a reallocation of the task.
Another interpretation of the model can be found in a recent paper of Barbera, Jackson and Neme [1] . There, sharing problems where agents might have natural claims, or are treated with di®erent priorities, are studied. In this setting they characterize the class of distribution rules that are strategy-proof and Pareto optimal, but which allow for an asymmetric treatment of the agents. Adding a third condition, describing a kind of individual monotonicity, yields a subclass of strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules which they call sequential allotment rules and which they consider to be a natural extension of the procedure which underlies the uniform rule. By applying uniform division in the stepwise de¯nition of a sequential allotment rule, thereby reducing the computation to one step, the uniform reallocation rule, introduced in Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] , is obtained.
In Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] the main result is the characterization of the uniform reallocation rule by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness and an equal-treatment condition based on the preferences and the net demands of the agents. This equity condition, which corresponds to Ching's equaltreatment condition for division problems, may be replaced by anonymity and translation invariance.
Like the uniform rule, the uniform reallocation rule satis¯es many desirable properties, which we study in the sequel. We can strengthen equaltreatment to envy-freeness which, in our setting, is formalized in terms of allotment changes and not in terms of the outcome as in the case of dividing a total endowment. Our¯rst result (Theorem 3.1) is that, similar to the total endowment case (see Thomson [10] , Lemma 1), the uniform reallocation rule is the unique reallocation rule satisfying Pareto optimality, peaks-onliness and envy-freeness.
Besides strategy-proofness, which describes the in°uence of certain preference variations on the outcome, and Pareto optimality, the uniform reallocation rule has several properties incorporating the variation of the remaining model assumptions.
One such property, introduced by Thomson [8] for the total endowment case, is population monotonicity. In the reallocation case this property describes the impact of merging two reallocation problems. We show (The-orem 3.2) that in the characterization of Theorem 3.1 peaks-onliness can be replaced by population monotonicity.
A further monotonicity property, endowment monotonicity, describes the change of the solution if certain endowment variations are considered. By decreasing (increasing) the endowments in case of excess demand (supply), no individual is better o® than before. This monotonicity condition is an extension of the one-sided resource-monotonicity of Thomson [10] , introduced for division problems. Thomson proves ( [10] , Theorem 2) that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, envy-freeness and one-sided resource-monotonicity for a restricted domain of single-peaked, continuous preferences. For the reallocation case a similar result (Theorem 4.4) can be deduced where the conditions of envy-freeness and monotonicity are adapted as indicated above. However, the proof of this characterization of the uniform reallocation rule is based on a di®erent argument and remains valid for the whole domain of single-peaked preferences.
The next property of the uniform reallocation rule we study is bilateral consistency. For the total endowment case, bilateral consistency of a rule requires the following. Consider a division assigned by a rule and assume that all agents except two leave with their assigned quantities of the good. If the remaining agents divide the remaining endowment again by applying the same rule, then they receive the same shares as before. In Thomson [9] two characterizations of the uniform rule by means of Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and continuity in the total amount to divide are provided. In the¯rst characterization ( [9] , Theorem 1) envy-freeness singles out the uniform rule. In the second characterization ( [9] , Theorem 2) envy-freeness is replaced by individual rationality from equal division: no agent, after the distribution, is worse o® than in the case of equally dividing the total endowment. In a recent study, Dagan shows that the continuity property may be skipped (see [4] , Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
In reallocation situations bilateral consistency not only prescribes the indi®erence of the outcome to the splitting o® of a group in a certain way, but it also includes an equity component. The leftover of the departing agents is, up to domain restrictions, equally added to the endowments of the remaining agents. Individual rationality from equal division in the total endowment case corresponds quite naturally to individual rationality (with respect to the initial endowments) in reallocation situations. After the reallocation no agent is worse o®. The latter two conditions (bilateral consistency and individual rationality) together with Pareto optimality determine the uniform reallocation rule for reallocation problems with at least three agents (Theorem 5.2). For reallocation problems with at least four agents individual rationality can be replaced by envy-freeness (Theorem 5.3). The proofs of Dagan's characterizations ( [4] , Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) can be adapted to the reallocation case. This yields di®erent proofs of Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 for problems with at least four agents. Further characteriza-tions of the uniform reallocation rule can be obtained by Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and extra conditions, for instance boundedness (of the outcome) by endowments and peaks (Theorem 5.1).
Finally, endowment strategy-proofness is studied. If initial endowments are private information it might happen that agents manipulate the outcome by only reporting|showing|a smaller part of their endowments. Reallocation rules where agents cannot pro¯t from withholding parts of their endowments are called endowment strategy-proof. Endowment strategyproofness together with Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and the dummy property (agents who have their peak as initial endowment do not participate in the reallocation) characterizes the uniform reallocation rule (Theorem 6.3). In Theorem 6.4 we show that we can replace endowment strategy-proofness and the dummy property by equal-treatment and a property called reversibility. This latter condition links the outcomes of excess demand and excess supply. To be more precise, consider a situation with demanders, having their peaks above their initial endowments, and suppliers, having their peaks below their initial endowments. Now this situation is reversed by turning demanders into suppliers with supply equal to their former demand and suppliers into demanders in a similar way. Reversibility requires that the allotment changes of the latter problem are opposite to those of the former.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the uniform reallocation rule. In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 we introduce the equity and variation properties which yield several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule. An overview over the results is given in Section 7 and the independence of the axioms used in the characterizations is shown. Furthermore, a discussion of the sensitivity of the model assumptions is included.
Reallocations
Consider exchange economies with a single good for which the agents have single-peaked (ordinal) utility, for instance strictly concave utility functions with a global optimum. So, the commodity space is one dimensional: IR + . If it is positive we say that the problem has excess demand. If it is zero, the problem is balanced and one would expect that the reallocation is such that every agent gets his peak. If it is negative, then we have excess supply.
A vector x = hx i i i2N ·û i for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) > 0 (excess demand), x i¸ûi for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) < 0 (excess supply), and x i =û i for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) = 0 (balancedness).
Sprumont [7] uses same-sidedness as de¯nition of Pareto optimality. In several properties, discussed hereafter, the number of agents is not xed, therefore solutions will be de¯ned over the set of all problems. To avoid repetition of the Pareto optimality condition, it is incorporated in the de¯nition of a rule as follows.
A pre-rule Ã assigns to every problem hN;e;ui a reallocation Ã(N; e; u).
A rule ' is a Pareto optimal pre-rule. Proof. By de¯nition, the uniform reallocation rule is same-sided and therefore Pareto optimal. Hence, the uniform reallocation rule is actually a rule. Also by de¯nition, U r satis¯es (a), (b), and (c). Suppose ' is a rule satisfying (a), (b), and (c), and let hN;e;ui be a problem. We prove that '(N; e; u) = U r (N; e; u). If the problem is balanced then this is obvious, so we suppose that the problem has excess demand (the excess supply case is analogous). Hence, z(N; e; u) > 0: If e i > ' i (N; e; u) for some i 2 N , then by feasibility there is a j 2 N such that e j < ' j (N; e; u). Hence ¢' i (N; e; u) is not maximal, so by (a) it follows that in that case For non-traders i, where e i = b u i , this also means that b u i = ' i (N; e; u). So, only demanders can be non-satiated, in which case they obtain maximal allotment change. Because of same-sidedness, it follows that nonsatiated demanders obtain less than their peaks. But then it follows that '(N; e; u) = U r (N; e; u).
Peaks-only rules
In this section we focus on rules which base the outcomes on the peaks instead of the complete utility functions. The uniform reallocation rule is such a rule. Moreover, it will appear to be the only rule which satis¯es this condition and at which no agent envies another one. Furthermore, a monotonicity condition is discussed. It is shown that this condition and envy-freeness imply the peaks-onliness condition. Because the uniform reallocation rule satis¯es this condition, this implication yields a second characterization of this rule. So, a rule ' is peaks-only if, and only if, the outcomes only depend on the peaks of the utility functions and not on the whole functions. As a manner of speaking, peaks-only rules ignore intensities. Nevertheless, many well-known rules are peaks-only. The uniform rule, the proportional rule, equal division and hierarchical rules, rules which are discussed in Section 7, are peaks-only. It is evident that by its de¯nition the uniform reallocation rule is also peaks-only. Clearly, if a rule takes intensities into account, then it is apt to be vulnerable to strategic behavior and more di±cult to apply.
The pre-rule ' is said to be envy-free if for all problems hN;e;ui and all individuals i; j 2 N with ¢' j (N; e; u) + e i¸0 , u i (¢' j (N; e; u) + e i ) · u i (' i (N; e; u)):
So, i envies j if i prefers j's allotment change, added to his endowment, to his own allotment|provided the former is feasible. The uniform reallocation rule is envy-free. For instance, in case of excess demand, only demanders can be non-satiated and, if so, they obtain the same, maximal allotment change.
The well-known property of envy-freeness was introduced by Foley [5] for resource allocation problems. Envy-freeness for division problems with single-peaked preferences was¯rst used by Sprumont in his axiomatic analysis of the uniform rule, [7] .
The following theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the only rule which is envy-free and peaks-only. 1 The main idea of the proof 1 Here as well as elsewhere in the paper, the expression \characterization" implies the logical independence of the characterizing axioms. For all characterizations appearing is that, because of these two properties, allotment changes for non-satiated agents are maximal or minimal, depending on whether the problem is in excess demand or in excess supply. As this typically describes the uniform reallocation rule, we are done. The theorem and its proof are similar to Lemma 3 and its proof in Thomson [10] , which treats the case of total endowment instead of initial endowments.
Theorem 3.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only envy-free and peaksonly rule.
Proof. Clearly, the uniform reallocation rule is an envy-free and peaks-only rule. In order to prove that it is the only one let ' be an envy-free and peaks-only rule. Let hN;e;ui be a problem. We prove that '(N; e; u) = U r (N; e; u). By Pareto optimality, it follows immediately that '(N; e; u) = Hence, the uniform reallocation rule is population monotonic. Moreover, the following theorem shows that envy-freeness and population monotonicity characterize the uniform reallocation rule. Proof. In order to prove that U r is the only envy-free and population monotonic rule suppose ' is such a rule. It is su±cient to prove that ' is peaks- 
Monotonicity
This section provides a characterization of the uniform reallocation rule which is based on an endowment monotonicity property. Endowment monotonicity means that if, in case of excess demand, the individual endowments decrease (or increase in case of excess supply), then no individual is better o® after the change. The characterization says that the uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is endowment monotonic and envy-free.
The stages of the proof of this characterization are as follows. First it is shown that endowment monotonicity and Pareto optimality imply coordinatewise continuity. Then another preliminary result is obtained. It says that endowment monotonic and envy-free rules have the dummy property. This latter condition means that non-traders are left on their endowments, hence receive zero allotment change. Next we show that endowment monotonic rules which satisfy the dummy property, assign allotments somewhere between the individual endowments and peaks. With these results the characterization follows easily.
Let ' be a rule. Because the properties, dealt with in this section, leave the group size and utilities unchanged, we¯x the set of agents at N The following lemma says that monotonic rules are coordinatewise continuous. A similar result for allocation problems, without initial endowments, can be found in Thomson [10] (in the proof of Theorem 2). A pre-rule ' is said to have the dummy property, if for all non-traders j at problem e the allotment change is zero, i.e., ' j (e) = e j . Proof. Suppose at problem e, ' j (e) 6 = e j for some non-trader j. This implies that z(e) 6 = 0 because otherwise, by Pareto optimality, every agent gets his peak. We assume z(e) > 0, the other case is similar.
By same-sidedness ' j (e) < b u j = e j . Furthermore, by monotonicity it is without loss of generality (lower the endowments if necessary) to assume that all agents, except agent j, have either maximal demand or zero as Hence, ' j (e) ·ẽ(") j · e j . Furthermore, denote the allotment changes at 
By monotonicity we have for all 0 · " · ¿ · ¡® and all i 6 = j:
Now (5) and (4) Boundedness by endowments and peaks implies the dummy property. Furthermore, boundedness by endowments and peaks implies individual rationality, i.e., for all problems e and all i 2 N u i (e i ) · u i (' i (e)).
The following lemma says that under monotonicity and same-sidedness the dummy property is equivalent to boundedness by endowments and peaks. Because ' j (¹ e) < ¹ e j , it follows by same-sidedness and feasibility that D(¹ e) 6 = fjg. Hence z(ẽ) > 0. Therefore by monotonicity we have ' i (¹ e) · ' i (ẽ) for all i 2 N. By feasibility this yields ' j (ẽ) · ' j (¹ e) +û j ¡ ¹ e j <û j =ẽ j . This, however, contradicts the dummy property. So, ' j (¹ e)¸¹ e j .
Finally, we can prove the characterization of this section. Proof. The uniform reallocation rule satis¯es both properties. In order to prove that it is the only one let ' be a rule with these properties, and consider problem e. Without loss of generality suppose z(e) > 0.
By same-sidedness and boundedness by endowments and peaks (Lem- Note that k is a non-trader at problem e(® 0 ; k). Hence, the set of suppliers has been decreased by one. Repeating this process yields a problem, sayẽ, such thatẽ l = e l for all l 2 D(e),ẽ k =û k for all k = 2 D(e) and e i + 4' j (ẽ) = e i + 4' j (ẽ) >û i . In particular, we have 4' j (ẽ) > 0. But then either feasibility or boundedness by endowments and peaks is violated.
Results on endowment monotonicity for allocation rules can be found in Thomson [10] . There, a characterization of the uniform allocation rule for a restricted class of single-peaked preferences 2 by one-sided resourcemonotonicity and envy-freeness is derived. Theorem 4.4, which can be seen as an extension of this result to the reallocation case, is based on a di®erent proof technique, and holds for the whole domain of single-peaked preferences.
2 The function H : 14+ ¡! 14+ [ f1g which assigns to each point either the corresponding indi®erence point on the other side of the peak, and zero or in¯nity if such a indi®erence point does not exists, has to be bounded.
Consistency
In this section two characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule are discussed. Consistency means that under the mechanism at hand subgroups of agents do not redistribute their subtotal di®erently. So, if a group of agents leaves with their allotments, then, loosely speaking, applying the mechanism on the remaining agents yields the same outcome as before. Actually, our characterizations only involve bilateral consistency, which means that only situations where two agents remain are considered. First we prove that the uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bilateral consistent and bounded by endowments and peaks. Then we show that replacing the latter condition by the weaker individual rationality condition, yields a second characterization of the uniform reallocation rule. Finally we show that for problems with at least four agents, bilateral consistency and envyfreeness determine the uniform reallocation rule.
A pre-rule ' is said to be bilaterally consistent, if for all problems hN;e;ui and all agents i; j 2 N , i 6 = j, The bilateral consistency property for reallocation problems, is based on Thomson's bilateral consistency for allocation problems, see [9] . There, bilateral consistency is de¯ned with respect to the remaining total endowment, which is left after the departure of all except two agents with their allotments. Then, dividing the remaining (total) endowment among the two agents, applying the same allocation rule, yields the same outcome as before.
3 By just applying mean allotment changes negative endowments, which are not admissable in this model, might occur.
In the reallocation case, however, we¯rst have to distribute the leftover among the two agents to get a reduced reallocation problem. So, bilateral consistency in this setting means that if two agents have to redivide their allotments according to the same rule, then this redivision is equal to the original outcome, provided that they start from adjusted endowments.
It is straightforward to prove that the uniform reallocation rule is bilaterally consistent.
The next theorem characterizes this rule as described before.
Theorem 5.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bilateral consistent and bounded by endowments and peaks.
Proof. Let ' be such a rule and hN;e;ui a problem. It is su±cient to prove that '(N; e; u) = U r (N; e; u). Without loss of generality suppose z(N; e; u) > 0; the case of excess supply or balancedness is similar. By boundedness by endowments and peaks and same-sidedness, ' i (N; e; u) =û i for all non-demanders i = For problems with at least three agents, the uniform reallocation rule is the only individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule.
Proof. Let ' be an individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule. It is su±cient to prove that ' is bounded by endowments and peaks (Theorem 5.1). Let hN;e;ui be a problem. Without loss of generality suppose z(N; e; u) > 0; the excess supply or balancedness case is similar. By individual rationality and same-sidedness, e j · ' j (N; e; u) ·û j for all j = 2 S(N; e; u). Take a supplier i 2 S(N; e; u), then by same-sidedness ' i (N; e; u) ·û i . Now suppose that ' i (N; e; u) <û i . We deduce a contradiction and are done. This obviously yields a contradiction.
The previous theorem holds if we¯x N and if N has at least three agents. For¯xed N with two agents the theorem does not hold, because in that situation bilateral consistency has no impact.
The last characterization in this section is obtained by extending a result of Dagan ([4] , Lemma 2) to reallocation rules and applying bilateral consistency and Theorem 3.1. Hence, ( (13) and (14)) the lemma is proven.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let ' be a bilaterally consistent and envy-free rule. Then, bilateral consistency together with Lemma 5.4 implies peaks-onliness for problems with an arbitrary number of agents n¸4. Then, by Theorem 3.1 the rule ' equals the uniform reallocation rule for problems with at least four agents.
In Thomson [9] and Dagan [4] results similar to those described in Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 are given for allocation rules. Thomson includes a continuity condition in his characterizations ( [9] , Theorem 1, Theorem 2), besides bilateral consistency, individual rationality from equal division or envy-freeness respectively. Dagan proves that the results of Thomson remain true without continuity for allocation problems with at least four agents ( [4] , Theorem 2, Theorem 3). Now, \translating" the steps of the proofs 4 in Dagans characterizations into the reallocation setting is almost su±cient to get alternative proofs of Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3. The argument of converse consistency (see [4] , Lemma 4), which completes the proofs of the characterizations, however, has no equivalent in the reallocation setting. By assuming that a rule, satisfying the characterizing properties, does not equal the uniform reallocation rule, and using bilateral consistency, a contradiction, which completes the alternative proofs, is easily derived.
Strategy-Proofness
In this section we discuss characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule in which endowment strategy-proofness plays a prominent role. This condition makes sense in those situations where the initial endowments are private information and the preferences are known. It guarantees, so to speak, that withholding some of the endowment by an agent is not pro¯table for that agent, whatever the other agents do. So, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy. If agents were also allowed to o®er more than their actually possession, then feasibility could cause that some agents obtain a negative allocation. Because our model does not allow such assignments, 4 [4] , Lemmas 2, 3, 5 and 6 can be proved in their \reallocation version ". supplies are considered to be real amounts handed out to the mechanism. Then, demands can be faked only by withholding endowment.
A pre-rule ' is said to be (endowment) strategy-proof, if for all problems hN;e;ui, all agents i 2 N and all e So, i's actual allotment in that situation is e i + 4' i (N; e 0 ; u). Therefore, strategy-proofness is de¯ned in this way. It means that i cannot envy himself in a situation of withholding endowment.
The following Lemma shows that if a rule is strategy-proof, then withholding endowment by non-satiated agents yields a smaller allotment change, in case of excess demand, and a greater allotment change, in case of excess supply. We have the following consequence of the previous lemma. This completes the proof.
A similar result cannot be obtained for the excess supply case, even if there were an upper bound for the endowments. (For instance, if there arē nite resources.) This is due to the asymmetry in the de¯nition, caused by the requirement of e 0 i · e i . Therefore, strategy-proofness as de¯ned here, has not such a great impact on the solution as one would expect. The following theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the only strategy-proof and bilaterally consistent rule which has the dummy property. Recalling Theorem 5.2, Theorem 6.3 implies that, if there are at least three agents, under bilateral consistency and Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness together with the dummy property is equivalent to individual rationality. Theorem 6.3. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bilaterally consistent, strategy-proof, and has the dummy property.
Proof. In order to prove that U r is the only rule with these properties, let ' be such a rule. Let hN;e;ui be a problem. If there is excess demand we are done by Corollary 6.2 and Theorem 5. fi;jg;e(i;j);u jfi;j g´= ' j (N; e; u). Because 4' i (N; e; u) · 0, e(i; j) j < ' j (N; e; u). Above, we proved that suppliers obtain an allotment change between their peak and their endowment. Therefore, at D fi;jg;e(i;j);u jfi;j g E j cannot be a supplier. So, e(i; j) j ·û j . Now, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.2, by introducing a sequence of non-traders l 1 ; l 2 ; : : : ; l t ; : : : we obtain a sequence of endowments e(i; l t ) j converging to ' j (fj; l t g;e(j;l t ); u jfj;lJ g ) = ' j (N; e; u) >û j , where j cannot be a supplier at D fj;l t g;e(j;l t ); u jfj;lJ g E . This cannot be the case.
In the second and last characterization of this section the condition of reversibility is needed.
A pre-rule ' is said to be reversible if for all problems hN;e;ui and hN;e In particular, this means that reversibility implies peaks-onliness. Furthermore, we need an equal-treatment condition in the following theorem.
A pre-rule ' is said to be equally-treating if for all problems hN;e;ui and all i; j 2 N, such that e i ¡û i = e j ¡û j , ¢' i (N; e; u) = ¢' j (N; e; u) .
The equal-treatment condition we introduce here is stronger than the equal-treatment condition introduced in Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] for reallocation rules.
By de¯nition the uniform reallocation rule satis¯es reversibility and equaltreatment. The following theorem says that it is the only such rule which in addition is strategy-proof. Proof. Let ' be such a rule. By reversibility it is su±cient to consider only problems with excess demand. Let hN;e;ui be a problem such that z(N; e; u) > 0. We prove that '(N; e; u) = U r (N; e; u). Because ' only depends on demands and supplies it is without loss of generality to suppose thatû i =û j for all i; j 2 N and 2û i ¡ e¸0 for all i 2 N.
Without loss of generality suppose D(N; e; u) = f1; Therefore, by feasibility, it is without loss of generality to suppose that In the preceding sections eight characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule were presented. To illustrate the relation between these results, we start this section with a schematic overview of these results. Combining some of the results immediately yields an ninth characterization (Theorem 7.1) by means of bilateral consistency, monotonicity and the dummy property.
Next, we discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to variations of the model assumptions.
Finally, independence of the conditions in the characterizations is demonstrated.
Overview of the Results
The following diagram illustrates the logical connections between the results of the foregoing sections.
In the sequel we use the following abbreviations.
PO Pareto optimality PSO peaks-onliness EF envy-freeness PM population monotonicity EM (endowment) monotonicity DP dummy property BEP boundedness by endowments and peaks BC bilateral consistency IR individual rationality SP strategy-proofness RE reversibility ET equal-treatment The logical independence of the characterizing conditions in all theorems discussed in the previous sections and earlier in this section is proven by means of eight reallocation (pre-)rules. These (pre-)rules are de¯ned below.
The endowment pre-rule ' e assigns to every individual at every problem hN;e;ui the initial endowment: In case of excess demand (supply), the hierarchical rule ' h satiates all suppliers (demanders) and the demanders (suppliers) according to their number. The rule ' 0 is equal to the uniform reallocation rule except for those problems hN;e;ui where all peaks are zero. In that case all agents except agent n, where N = f1;::: ; ng, are satiated and feasibility of the allocation is adjusted on the account of n. So, ifû 6 = 0 (the zero vector), then In case of z(N; e; u) · 0,' is de¯ned similarly.
The following table shows which of the previous pre-rules satis¯es which of the characterizing conditions. The last nine rows of this table indicate for each characterization and each (pre-)rule which condition is not satis¯ed by the (pre-)rules while all other characterizing conditions are satis¯ed. The last table below illustrates the trade-o®s between the di®erent characterizations. Roughly speaking there are four groups of conditions; I conditions present in all characterizations (and therefore not interesting with respect to a trade-o® discussion), II conditions of equity, III conditions relating di®erent problems, and IV conditions that bound the outcome. Conditions of the¯rst three groups appear in all characterizations. The last group is only present, when bilateral consistency, which also belongs to the second group, is one of the characterizing conditions. Clearly the price which has to be paid for using this hybrid condition of group II and III is either a relatively strong condition of group IV or the weaker dummy property in combination with strategy-proofness or monotonicity. Comparing Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 we see that the trade-o® of relaxing the equity condition is compensated by the relatively strong reversibility condition of group IV. Table 3 Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O.
Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
